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THE CHOICE BETWEEN MADISON AND FDR 
RANDY BARNETT* 
This exchange is about three clauses that have often been used 
by the courts since the New Deal to expand federal power: the 
Commerce Clause, the Necessary and Proper Clause, and the 
Taxation Clause, from which the spending power has (at least 
until today) been construed. This Essay addresses the originalist 
interpretation of the Necessary and Proper Clause.  
Now, because I have not studied the matter closely, I am not 
going to comment on the spending power. I have always been 
attracted, though, to Madison’s view that there is no freestand-
ing spending power, but only a power to spend what is neces-
sary and properly incident to the enumerated powers. Madison 
did not believe that the spending power grew out of the taxa-
tion power, but instead that all exercises of the spending power 
had to be incident to the other enumerated powers.1 I am not, 
however, going to make the argument for this position here. 
Nor am I going to spend much time discussing the original 
meaning of the Commerce Clause. In my book, Restoring the Lost 
Constitution,2 I identified every use of the word “commerce” in 
the Constitutional Convention, the ratification debates, and the 
Federalist Papers.3 In a separate study, I examined the over 1,500 
times the word “commerce” appeared in the Philadelphia Gazette 
between 1728 and 1800.4 In all of these appearances of the word 
“commerce,” I could not find one clear example where the term 
was used to apply more broadly than the meaning identified by 
                                                                                                        
* Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Legal Theory, Georgetown University 
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1. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 41, at 264–65 (James Madison) (Robert Scigliano 
ed., 2000) (rejecting the proposition that “the power ‘to lay and collect taxes’ . . . 
amounts to an unlimited commission to exercise every power which may be 
alleged to be necessary for the common defence or general welfare”). 
2. RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF 
LIBERTY (2004). 
3. See id. at 278–89. 
4. See id. at 289–91. 
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Justice Thomas in his concurring opinion in Lopez,5 in which he 
maintained that the word “commerce” refers to the trade and 
exchange of goods, along with the process of trading and ex-
changing, including transportation.6 
The January 13, 1790 issue of the Pennsylvania Gazette included 
a representative use of the word “commerce” at the Founding: 
Agriculture, manufacturers and commerce are acknowledged 
to be the three great sources of wealth in any state. By the 
first [agriculture] we are to understand not only tillage, but 
whatever regards the improvement of the earth; as the 
breeding of cattle, the raising of trees, plants and all vegeta-
bles that may contribute to the real use of man; the opening 
and working of mines, whether of metals, stones, or mineral 
drugs . . . . By the second [manufacturers], all the arts, man-
ual and mechanic; . . . by the third [commerce], the whole ex-
tent of navigation with foreign countries.7 
So this is how one source distinguished agriculture, manufac-
turing, and commerce; a very common trilogy that was re-
peatedly invoked. 
For an originalist, direct evidence of the actual use of a word 
is the most important source of the word’s meaning. It is more 
important than referring to the “broader context.” Appealing to 
the “larger context” or the “underlying principles” of the text is 
the means by which some today are able to turn the words 
“black” into “white” and “up” into “down.” 
Now, it may come as some surprise to you to learn that even 
the New Deal Supreme Court never formally broadened the 
meaning of the term “commerce” in any of its cases. Instead, it 
relied on an expanded interpretation of the Necessary and 
Proper Clause to enlarge the powers of the national govern-
ment. The New Deal Supreme Court never redefined the word 
“commerce.” There is no case in which it said, “oh no, com-
merce means more today than it used to mean.” Instead the 
Court expanded the use of the Necessary and Proper Clause to 
                                                                                                        
5. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
6. Id. at 585 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“At the time the original Constitution was 
ratified, ‘commerce’ consisted of selling, buying, and bartering, as well as trans-
porting for these purposes.”). 
7. BARNETT, supra note 2, at 274. 
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reach activity that it admitted was not commerce but which it 
was necessary and proper to reach anyway.8 
Thus, this Essay focuses on the Necessary and Proper Clause. 
Now, unfortunately, because the Necessary and Proper Clause 
uses a term of art, you cannot find its original meaning by ex-
amining how the word “necessary” or the word “proper” was 
commonly used, the way you can when you are looking for a 
term like “commerce.” You really do need to examine the con-
text in which this phrase was introduced into the Constitution, 
and how it was explained to the public when it was criticized 
by the Anti-Federalists as conveying the kind of sweeping and 
unlimited powers to Congress that Professor Michael Paulsen 
has claimed for it,9 and that Justice Scalia described in his con-
curring opinion in Raich.10 
 
* * * 
 
The Necessary and Proper Clause was added to the Constitu-
tion by the Committee of Detail without any previous discus-
sion by the Constitutional Convention. Nor was it the subject of 
any debate from its initial proposal to the Convention’s final 
adoption of the Constitution. The likely reason why the Neces-
sary and Proper Clause received no attention from the Conven-
tion became clear during the ratification convention debates, as 
did the Clause’s public meaning.  
In the ratification debates, opponents of the Constitution 
pointed to this clause as evidence that the national government 
had virtually unlimited and undefined powers. In other words, 
the Anti-Federalists said, “Look, we object to this Constitution 
because it is going to lead to the very kind of powers that Profes-
sor Paulsen told you the federal government has.”11 In the New 
                                                                                                        
8. See, e.g., United States v. Wrightwood Dairy, 315 U.S. 110, 121 (1942) (“We 
conclude that the national power to regulate the price of milk moving inter-
state . . . extends to such control over intrastate transactions . . . as is necessary 
and appropriate to make the regulations of the interstate commerce effective.” 
(emphasis added)). 
9. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, A Government of Adequate Powers, 31 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 991, 995–96 (2008). 
10. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 34–35 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Where 
necessary to make a regulation of interstate commerce effective, Congress may 
regulate even those intrastate activities that do not themselves substantially affect 
interstate commerce.”). 
11. See Paulsen, supra note 9, at 992–93. 
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York ratifying convention, for example, Anti-Federalist John 
Williams contended that “[i]t is perhaps utterly impossible fully 
to define this power.”12 For this reason, “[w]hatever they judge 
necessary for the proper administration of the powers lodged in 
them, they may execute without any check or impediment.”13 
Federalist supporters of the Constitution repeatedly denied 
the charge that all discretion over the scope of its own powers 
effectively resided in Congress. They insisted that the Neces-
sary and Proper Clause was not an additional freestanding 
grant of power but merely made explicit what was already 
implicit in the grant of each enumerated power. As explained 
by George Nicholas in the Virginia ratifying convention, “the 
Constitution had enumerated all the powers which the gen-
eral government should have, but did not say how they were 
to be exercised. It therefore, in this clause, tells how they shall 
be exercised.”14 Like other Federalists, Nicholas denied that 
this clause gave “any new power [to Congress].”15 “Suppose,” 
he reasoned,  
it had been inserted, at the end of every power, that they 
should have power to make laws to carry that power into 
execution; would this have increased their powers? If, there-
fore, it could not have increased their powers, if placed at the 
end of each power, it cannot increase them at the end of all.16  
In short, “[the C]lause only enables [the Congress] to carry into 
execution the powers given to them. It gives them no additional 
power.”17 
James Madison, in Virginia, added his voice to the chorus, 
when he said, “the sweeping clause . . . only extended to the 
enumerated powers. Should Congress attempt to extend it to 
any power not enumerated, it would not be warranted by the 
clause.”18 Also in Virginia, Edmund Pendleton, President of the 
                                                                                                        
12. 2 DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 331 (Jonathan 
Elliot ed., Ayer Co. Publishers 1987) (1836). 
13. Id. at 338. 
14. 3 DEBATES, supra note 12, at 245. 
15. Id. at 245–46. 
16. Id. 
17. Id. at 246. 
18. Id. at 455. 
 No. 3] The Choice Between Madison and FDR 1009 
Convention, insisted that this clause did not go “a single step 
beyond the delegated powers.”19 If Congress were  
about to pass a law in consequence of this clause, they must 
pursue some of the delegated powers, but can by no means 
depart from them or arrogate any new powers; for the plain 
language of the clause is, to give them power to pass laws in 
order to give effect to the delegated powers.20  
The same point was made in the North Carolina convention. 
In Pennsylvania, James Wilson explained that this clause “is 
saying no more than that the powers we have already particu-
larly given, shall be effectually carried into execution.”21 And 
Thomas McKean insisted that “it gives to Congress no further 
powers than those already enumerated.”22 
So here, then, is the likely explanation for the lack of debate 
surrounding the Clause at the Philadelphia Convention. If the 
power to make law was already thought to be implicit in the 
enumerated power scheme, it is not surprising that the Clause 
would provoke no discussion at the Convention. Unfortunately, 
most interpreters today, including many originalists, go no fur-
ther in their investigation of the original meaning of the Neces-
sary and Proper Clause than Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in 
McCulloch v. Maryland,23 written in 1819, some thirty years after 
the ratification of the Constitution. 
In McCulloch, Marshall upheld the constitutionality of the Sec-
ond National Bank of the United States.24 The bill establishing the 
second Bank had been signed into law by President James Madi-
son, a man who had, as a Representative in the First Congress, 
strongly objected to the constitutionality of the First National 
Bank on the ground that it exceeded the enumerated powers of 
Congress. Here is what Madison said in his speech to Congress: 
Whatever meaning this clause may have, none can be admit-
ted, that would give an unlimited discretion to Congress. Its 
meaning must, according to the natural and obvious force of 
the terms and the contexts, be limited to the means necessary 
to the end, and incident to the nature of the specified powers. 
                                                                                                        
19. Id. at 441. 
20. Id.  
21. 2 DEBATES, supra note 12, at 468. 
22. Id. at 537. 
23. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
24. Id.  
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The clause is in fact merely declaratory of what would have 
resulted by unavoidable implication, as the appropriate, and 
as it were, technical means of executing those powers. In this 
sense it had been explained by the friends of the constitution, 
and ratified by the state conventions. The essential characteris-
tics of the government, as composed of limited and enumer-
ated powers, would be destroyed: If instead of direct and inci-
dental means, any means could be used, which in the language 
of the preamble to the bill, ‘might be conceived to be conducive 
to the successful conducting of the finances; or might be con-
ceived to tend to give facility to the obtaining of loans.’25 
He then went on to say: 
Mark the reasoning on which the validity of the bill depends. 
To borrow money is made the end and the accumulation of 
capitals, implied as the means. The accumulation of capitals is 
then the end, and a bank implied as the means. The bank is then 
the end, and a charter of incorporation, a monopoly, capital 
punishments, &c. implied as the means. If implications, thus 
remote and thus multiplied, can be linked together, a chain 
may be formed that will reach every object of legislation, 
every object within the whole compass of political economy.26 
This was Representative Madison’s reason for opposing the 
first Bank. Yet as President, decades later, he signed the bill 
approving the second Bank. Did this mean he had abandoned 
his earlier restrictive reading of “necessary and proper”?  
Although Madison eventually came to be persuaded, by prac-
tice, that a national bank is incident enough to the enumerated 
powers to be constitutional, he nevertheless strongly objected to 
the opinion in McCulloch, in which Chief Justice Marshall fa-
mously equated the term “necessary” with mere convenience: 
But what is of most importance is the high sanction given to 
a latitude in expounding the Constitution which seems to 
break down the landmarks intended by a specification of the 
Powers of Congress, and to substitute for a definite connec-
tion between means and ends, a Legislative discretion as to 
the former to which no practical limit can be assigned.27 
Madison both acknowledged the supposedly modern insight 
that the national economy is interconnected and rejected this in-
                                                                                                        
25. JAMES MADISON, WRITINGS 484–85 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1999). 
26. Id. at 486. 
27. Id. at 734. 
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terconnection as a basis for a latitudinarian interpretation of 
“necessary”: 
In the great system of Political Economy having for its gen-
eral object the national welfare, everything is related imme-
diately or remotely to every other thing; and consequently a 
Power over any one thing, if not limited by some obvious 
and precise affinity, may amount to a Power over every 
other. Ends & means may shift their character at the will & 
according to the ingenuity of the Legislative Body.28 
He then concluded with his real objection: “Is there a Legislative 
power in fact, not expressly prohibited by the Constitution, 
which might not, according to the doctrine of the Court, be exer-
cised as a means for carrying into effect some specified Power?”29 
And it was not just Madison who was displeased with 
McCulloch. The popular outcry against McCulloch was so great 
that Chief Justice Marshall himself felt moved to defend his deci-
sion in an essay he published anonymously under the name “A 
Friend of the Constitution.”30 Imagine if former Chief Justice 
Rehnquist had been so vilified for a judicial opinion he had writ-
ten that he published anonymous op-eds in the Wall Street Journal 
defending the opinion. But that is exactly what John Marshall did. 
Here is a part of what Chief Justice Marshall said in defense 
of McCulloch, which shows that even he denied that McCulloch 
meant what it later came to be interpreted to mean: 
In no single instance does the Court admit the unlimited 
power of congress to adopt any measure whatever, and thus 
to pass the limits prescribed by the constitution. Not only is 
the discretion claimed for the legislature in the selection of 
its means, always limited in terms, to such as are appropri-
ate, but the court also expressly says, “should congress un-
der the pretext of executing its powers, pass laws for the ac-
complishment of objects, not entrusted to the government, it 
would become the painful duty of this tribunal . . . to say 
that such an act was not the law of the land.31 
That is Chief Justice Marshall, not me, interpreting McCulloch v. 
Maryland. 
                                                                                                        
28. Id.  
29. Id.  
30. Essays from the Alexandria Gazette: John Marshall, “A Friend of the Constitu-
tion,” 21 STAN. L. REV. 456 (1969). 
31. Id. at 478–79. 
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So, who was right? Madison or Marshall? In an article on the 
original meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause,32 I con-
tended that the difference between Democratic-Republicans, 
such as Madison and Jefferson, and Federalists, such as Hamil-
ton and Marshall, was far less significant than it appears today. 
On the one hand, both sides insisted that a law be “plainly 
adapted” to an enumerated power, or what we today call a de-
gree of “means-ends fit.” On the other hand, both sides rejected 
the idea that “necessary” means “indispensably requisite,” the 
meaning urged upon the McCulloch Court by the State of Mary-
land and properly rejected by Chief Justice Marshall. Madison 
had much earlier rejected “indispensably requisite” as the proper 
interpretation of “necessary” on the ground that it would make 
federal governance nearly impossible. 
The primary problem with reading McCulloch and other 
Marshall opinions, like Gibbons v. Ogden,33 is seeing past the 
gloss placed on these decisions by defenders of the Supreme 
Court’s expansive interpretation of national powers to uphold 
President Roosevelt’s New Deal program. The loose reading of 
these Marshall Court opinions was advanced so the New Deal 
Court’s jurisprudence could be characterized as a “restoration” 
of original meaning, rather than the constitutional revolution 
that even most progressive scholars today would readily admit 
it was. The challenge for those who accept originalism is to dis-
tinguish between the Madisonian and the Rooseveltian inter-
pretations of federal power, especially when the government 
invokes the Necessary and Proper Clause. 
Consider the medical cannabis case of Gonzalez v. Raich,34 
which I argued in the Supreme Court. In his dissenting opin-
ion, Justice Thomas adopted a Madisonian interpretation: 
The Necessary and Proper Clause is not a warrant to Con-
gress to enact any law that bears some conceivable connection 
to the exercise of an enumerated power. Nor is it, however, a 
command to Congress to enact only laws which are abso-
lutely indispensable to the exercise of an enumerated power. 
                                                                                                        
32. Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause, 6 U. 
PA. J. CONST. LAW 183 (2003). 
33. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). 
34. 545 U.S. 1 (2005). 
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 . . . To act under the Necessary and Proper Clause, then, 
Congress must select a means that is ‘appropriate’ and 
‘plainly adapted’ to executing an enumerated power; and 
the means cannot be otherwise prohibited by the Constitu-
tion. The means cannot be inconsistent ‘with the letter and 
spirit of the [C]onstitution.’35  
 . . . . 
 In sum, neither in enacting the [Controlled Substance Act] 
nor in defending its application to respondents has the Gov-
ernment offered any obvious reason why banning medical 
marijuana use is necessary to stem the tide of interstate drug 
trafficking. Congress’ goal of curtailing the interstate drug 
trade would not plainly be thwarted if it could not apply the 
CSA to patients like Monson and Raich. That is, unless Con-
gress’ aim is really to exercise police power of the sort re-
served to the states in order to eliminate even the intrastate 
possession and use of marijuana.36 
I think we all know that is exactly what Congress was trying 
to accomplish; it was not trying just to limit interstate com-
merce. It was trying to use its power over interstate commerce 
to exert a police power over purely local conduct of a sort that 
is reserved to the States. In short, the Congress is trying to 
override the inherent constraints on its powers that result from 
a federal system of government. As Justice Thomas wrote: 
 Even assuming the CSA’s ban on locally cultivated and 
consumed marijuana is “necessary,” that does not mean it is 
also “proper.” 
 . . . . 
 Even if Congress may regulate purely intrastate activity 
when essential to exercising some enumerated power, . . . [it] 
may not use its incidental authority to subvert basic princi-
ples of federalism and dual sovereignty.37 
 In Raich, Justice Thomas did not deny that the enumerated 
powers of Congress are supreme where they are inconsistent 
with the exercise of the state police power. Rather, he claimed 
that, under the Necessary and Proper Clause, it is an improper 
extension of those enumerated powers to imply other powers that 
                                                                                                        
35. Id. at 59–60. 
36. Id. at 64 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
37. Id. at 64–65. 
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interfere with the fundamental principles of federalism and dual 
sovereignty. In Raich, the Court upheld an implied power to reach 
wholly intrastate, noneconomic activity even when it severely in-
terfered with the police power of states to promote the health of 
its citizens (and also to regulate the practice of medicine). 
Now, contrast Justice Thomas’s dissent with Justice Scalia’s 
concurring opinion in Raich, in which he adopted a Rooseveltian 
interpretation of the Necessary and Proper Clause: 
 Lopez and Morrison affirm that Congress may not regulate 
“purely local” activities within the States based solely on the at-
tenuated effect that such activity may have in the interstate 
market. But those decisions do not declare noneconomic intra-
state activities to be categorically beyond the reach of the Fed-
eral Government. Neither case involved the power of Congress 
to exert control over intrastate activities in connection with a 
more comprehensive scheme of regulation . . . . To dismiss this 
distinction as “superficial and formalistic” is to misunderstand 
the nature of the Necessary and Proper Clause, which empow-
ers Congress to enact laws in effectuation of its enumerated 
powers that are not within its authority to enact in isolation.38 
What renders Justice Scalia’s interpretation of the Necessary 
and Proper Clause “Rooseveltian” is his extreme deference to 
the decision of Congress as to whether it really is essential to a 
larger regulatory scheme for the legislation it passes to reach 
wholly intrastate, noneconomic activities that, traditionally, 
have been included within the police power of individual 
states. Like Madison, the dissenters in Raich required some 
showing of a means-ends fit. Like the New Deal Court, Justice 
Scalia left the question of means-ends fit entirely up to Congress. 
And also like the New Deal Court, he denied that this interfer-
ence with the traditional police powers of states is an improper 
construction of implied federal power. 
 
* * * 
The remarkably successful coalition that is the Federalist Soci-
ety stands today at a crossroad. In one direction is a continuing 
Madisonian commitment to originalism, according to which the 
powers of the national government are limited, and these textual 
limits are enforceable by courts. Just as the courts are restrained 
from changing the meaning of the Constitution, so too is Congress. 
                                                                                                        
38. Id. at 38–39 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (citations omitted). 
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In the other direction is a Rooseveltian commitment to judi-
cial restraint above all else, a restraint that is justified by distort-
ing original meaning, by creating some insurmountable burden 
of proof before legislation can be overturned, or by claiming 
that it is too late to revisit New Deal era “super-precedents.”39 
Take your pick. Perhaps a jurisprudence of complete and total 
judicial restraint, paired with unlimited national power, pro-
vides a better world than a jurisprudence of a written constitu-
tion with limited and enumerated national powers. But if that 
is the road that the members of the Federalist Society choose to 
take, then I suggest we change the silhouette in our banner 
from that of James Madison to that of FDR. 
                                                                                                        
39. See Randy E. Barnett, It’s a Bird, It’s a Plane, No, It’s Super-Precedent: A Reply 
to Farber and Gerhard, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1232 (2006). 
